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Despriet: Improved Definition of Discovery Relevance: A Path Out of the Ant
FCC'S CABLE TELEVISION JURISDICTION

to adequately distinguish the previous circuit court decisions. Together these
three circuits have highlighted the ambiguity and underlying weakness of
Midwest Video.
Were the Supreme Court to revisit the Midwest Video decision, with a
view toward reconciliation of the recent lower court decisions, the Court
should review the context in which the Midwest Video decision was made.
Chief Justice Burger's concurring vote, in particular, might be found susceptible to reversal because of the intervening enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act.
Accepting this course, the Court might then more narrowly delineate the
'FCC's cable jurisdiction. Further, it might choose to define the Commission's
ancillary authority over cable in terms of the cable function regulated. The
test would be whether the activity that the FCC attempted to regulate directly
used broadcast signals. That test would certainly be consistent with Southwestern and the results in the lower courts. Its effect would be to substantially
deregulate cable television, an appropriate result considering the fact that
Congress has never delegated to the FCC any authority to regulate the cable
industry. Congress might then be prodded to resolve democratically the controversial policy issues that cable raises. Until then, the deregulation of
cable would be consistent with established policies favoring competition and
diversification, as well as with general principles of administrative law.
EDWIN I. MALET

IMPROVED DEFINITION OF DISCOVERY RELEVANCE:
A PATH OUT OF THE ANTITRUST PROCEDURAL QUAGMIRE
INTMODUCTION

The federal antitrust laws maintain a competitive and efficient economy by
prohibiting business activity adverse to the operation of a competitive market.
The discovery procedures often used in antitrust suits, however, have adversely
impacted on the effectiveness of both government and private enforcement of
the antitrust laws.' These practices include broad discovery which has had a
chilling effect on the entire enforcement program. 2 As a result, antitrust policy
has been frustrated. Relevance, the concept which theoretically narrows the
scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, suffers from a
1. See generally Byrnes, Discovery: Its Uses and Abuses -the Defendant's Perspective, 44
A.B.A. ANTrRUST LJ. 14 (1975); Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation -Have Good Intentions
Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199 (1976).
2. Formal study of the problem was first undertaken in 1949 with a special committee on
Procedure in Antitrust and Other Protracted Cases. The report of the committee is known as
the Prettyman Report, 13 F.R.D. 62 (1951). Study continues. See note 7 infra.
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lack of definition3 The amorphous nature of discovery relevance as applied to
complex litigation has contributed directly to the unmanageability of the "big
case." 4
There is agreement among the bench, the bar and the business community
that the functioning of the antitrust laws is hampered by the prevalence of
liberal discovery.5 The Department of justice recently announced major
changes in its enforcement policy designed to avoid pre-trial discovery
quagmires which drain its resources. 6 Additionally, the President has appointed
a special advisory committee to recommend expeditious alternatives to current
antitrust enforcement practices.7 Part of the problem stems from the unpredictable nature of the substantive antitrust laws; however, federal, private and
state enforcers still face the uncertainty of potentially devastating and unnecessary discovery spawned by an undefined concept of relevance. s
Relevance decisions in both complex and simple cases lack consistency.
Analysis of discovery problems characteristically does not fully weigh the
implications inherent in antitrust discovery. This note will analyze the current
judicial decision-making process in the relevance area, discuss the implications
of antitrust discovery, and suggest a decisional framework for improved discovery based on a revised 'legal definition of relevance. Amelioration of discovery abuses through the improved concept will further the national economic
policy behind the antitrust laws and revitalize the underlying policy of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requiring the efficient administration of
justice.
The relevance of information sought during discovery is a direct function
of the substantive law. Accordingly, the nature of antitrust law will be dis3. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
4. See Withrow & Larm, The Big Antitrust Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean Labor, 62 CoRNELL
L. REv. 1 (1976); see also FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrTIGATION (Moore's
ed. 1977).
5. See generally Symposium -- Discovery in Civil Antitrust Suits, 44 A.B.A. ANTrrvsr L.J.
I (1975). There is also some discussion on whether or not major antitrust actions should be
removed from the courts altogether and handled by a commission of experts. See Kirkham,
Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199 (1976). See also
Kaufman, Report on the Study of the Protracted Case, 21 F.R.D. 55, 63 (1957) (address delivered to the Tenth Circuit Judicial Conference) where it was said: "Lawyers frequently express the view that this phase of protracted cases- the discovery phase, has become so costly,
so time-consuming and so exasperating, that litigants are being priced out of the courts. I
have heard them discuss such discovery proceedings in terms of cruel and unusual punishment."
6. Schellhardt & Schorr, Carter's Trustbusters Seek to Speed Cases by Maneuvering Line
of Attack in Big Suits, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1978, at 38, col. 2. "Troubled by the dollars and
staff they are pouring into [giant federal antitrust] litigation- and the long uncertain wait
for any benefits to competition from their efforts- President Carter's trustbusters are switching to antitrust tactics on a smaller scale."
7. Exec. Order No. 12,022, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,441 (Dec. 1, 1977). The order established a
15-member National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures. Among
the subjects under'study are revision of procedural and substantive law needed to expedite
the resolution of complex cases, revision of pleading requirements to narrow the issues, and
revision of discovery practices in order to limit inquiry.
8. See 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrIcE 26, 56[l], at 26-131 (2d ed. 1976).
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cussed to provide a background for relevance analysis. A brief overview of the
Federal Rules is also necessary to place relevance in proper perspective as a
distinct concept. An analysis of the judicial struggle with the concept of
relevance in general and in antitrust litigation will be presented. Finally, the
effects of antitrust discovery will be examined with a view toward consistency
in relevance determinations. 9
ThE ANTTRUST LAWS
The antitrust laws are based on
theory. One of the most basic of these
in a capitalist sodety produces the
corollary is that competition leads to

fundamental free enterprise economic
economic principles is that competition
most goods at the lowest price. The
optimum satisfaction of society's needs
10
and desires. Flowing from this foundation is the legislative notion that the
maintenance and promotion of competition is a legitimate national policy.
Monopoly is an impediment to competition and causes a less efficient allocation of resources. In effect, the power of the monopolist replaces that of the
consumer in the marketplace. Society is therefore harmed by the monopolist
whose profit maximization goals conflict with the efficient economic operation
produced by competition. To avoid such interference with the competitive
market, monopoly and associated behavior are generally condemned by the
antitrust laws." The antitrust laws, however, extend beyond monopoly to a
wide range of activities with potentially anticompetitive effects. 1 2
The Sherman, 3 Clayton 4 and Federal Trade Commission'1 Acts are the
primary antitrust statutes. They are cast in broad language which delegates to
the judiciary the task of defining illegal activity.16 The courts have responded
9. Significant steps have been taken to speed the administration of complex cases. They
include: (1) standardized procedures for early judicial control of complex litigation (see
FEDERAL JuDIcIAL CONFERENCF, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (Moore's ed. 1977)); (2) the

use of special masters to supervise discovery (see Weinstein, Standing Masters to Supervise
Discovery in the Southern District, New York, 23 F.R.D. 36 (1958); but see La Buy v. Towes
Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957)); (3) transfer of related cases to a single district and referral
to the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1407 (1970); (4)
bifurcation of issues (see Fa. R. Cirv. P. 42(b)). See, e.g., Broadway Delivery v. United Parcel
Service of America, Inc., 1977-2 Trade Cases Par. 61,688 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). For a general discussion of various techniques employed to manage complex litigation, see Proceedingsof the
Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319, 319-613 (1958). See generally McElroy, Federal
Pre-TrialProcedure in an Antitrust Suit, 31 Sw. L.J. 649 (1977).
10. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (2d ed. 1977); ARFmaA, AuNmusr ANALYSIS

6-40 (1973).
11. Some monopolies are considered justified and are regulated.
12. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical
xestraints of trade); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (combination
in restraint of trade); United States v. IBM Corp., 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (tying arrangements).
13. 15 US.C. §107 (1970).
14. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§12-27 (1970).
15. Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended by 15 U.S.C. §§41-58
(1970). See also Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act of 1936, 15 U.S.C. §13 (1970).
16. An example is the Sherman Act, §1, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970), as amended: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal." See also, Clayton Act of 1914, §7, 15 U.S.C. §18 (1970)
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by adopting the conceptually complex "Rule of Reason"' 7 which has led to
uncertainty in many areas of antitrust law.' 8
Antitrust violations are usually established by proof of the defendant's
culpable behavior and the economic effects of that behavior. Specific categories
of activity such as membership in a cartel, price-fixing and tying agreements
are illegal per se and thus require only proof that such practices are taking
place. 19 In addition to these per se violations, however, there is a wide range of
behavior which is illegal only if the anticompetitive effect violates the Rule of
Reason.
Proof of economic effect often involves a thorough economic inquiry into
an entire industry. However, such an analysis in the context of a complex
economy and large corporations often requires extensive pre-trial discovery.
(mergers prohibited where effect may be to substantially lessen competition or to tend to
create a monopoly).
17. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The Rule of Reason grew from
the Court's search for a standard to apply in interpreting the broad language of the Sherman
Act. Every contract is conceivably a restraint of trade since it forecloses competition on its
subject matter. Justice White concluded that "[I]t follows that it was intended [by Congress]
that the standard of reason . ..was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of
determining whether, in a given case, a particular act had or had not brought about the
wrong against which the statute provided." Id. at 60. Therefore, only unreasonable restraints
of trade are illegal. Justice Harlan, dissenting in part and concurring in part, lamented the
uncertainty wrought by the standard. Id. at 97. Whether a court will find a specific business
arrangement an unreasonable restraint of trade is often difficult to predict. The Rule of
Reason still prevails in antitrust law. Practices which are classified per se illegal are not an
exception to the Rule of Reason, but rather are of such a nature that under any conceivable
fact situation, they could not be found reasonable because the anticompetitive effects would
outweigh any justification for the practice. See United States v. Socony Vaccum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940) (agreement to fix prices is per se illegal).
18. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission
are the federal government's antitrust enforcement agencies. The FTC is also charged with
policing unfair and deceptive trade practices. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, §5, 15
U.S.C. §§4-5 (1970). The government enforcement is aided by the treble damage provisions
of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended by 15 U.S.C. §4 (1970). Additional enforcement
capability has been added by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-435, §4, 90 Stat. 1383, which gives states standing to sue as parens patriae on
behalf of consumer-residents. See Scher, Emerging Issues Under the Antitrust Improvements
Act, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1977). In the year ending June 30, 1976, there were 51 government and 1504 private civil antitrust suits filed. The government also filed 19 criminal antitrust actions.

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS, ANNUAL

OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs, 191 Table 27 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as 1976 ANNUAL REPORT]. See H. REP. No. 94-1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Ni-,Ws 2572, 2600. The committee outlined the alternatives open
to the Justice Department for obtaining information upon which to base a decision on
REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

whether to file a civil suit. The Committee said that the government could file a skeleton
complaint and use the broad discovery provisions of the Federal Rules to flesh out the complaint. The practice was labelled poor and rejected as an untenable solution. Id. The
Justice Department received broader civil investigatory powers under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, §5, 90 Stat. 1383.

19. See Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977) overruling United States v.
Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (vertical restraints per se violations of Sherman
Act, §1).
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20
the Supreme Court
For example, in United States v. DuPont de Nemour
found it necessary to analyze the entire flexible packaging industry as well as
the corporate history of the alleged monopolist in order to reach the conclusion that no monopoly existed.
Pre-trial investigation into corporate behavior often entails extensive discovery of the details of the defendant's operation over a long period of time.
Additional complexity can arise when a requisite intent must be circumstantially proven from decades of corporate -pperations.21 In monopolization
cases, discovery is further complicated when the defendant seeks to prove the
affirmative defense of superior skill, foresight and industry with information in
possession of other parties. 22 This complex process is graphically illustrated by
23
the nine years of discovery in the ongoing case of United States v. IBM Corp.
In order to gain information in support of its affirmative defense, the defendant
sought and was granted a pre-trial order which forbade any agency of the
government from destroying any documents which in any way related to electronic data processing equipment. 24 The breadth of this discovery order has had
a staggering effect on both parties' resources. The duration of antitrust suits
reflects the overall effect of discovery in such cases. For example, the time between filing and termination of government antitrust cases averages two and
one half times the average length of all government civil cases, with ten per
cent of the antitrust cases lasting over six years.2 5 Private antitrust suits which
go to trial average a year longer than other federal question actions; ten per26
cent of the private suits decided in fiscal year 1976 exceeded sixty-five months.
Additionally, broad discovery has influenced the settlement rates in antitrust suits. Two-thirds of all antitrust cases are terminated before pre-trial discovery actually begins. Only ten percent of the suits filed are resolved by court
action.27 In addition, antitrust cases are four times as likely as other federal
cases to be pending three years after initiation.28

20. (Cellophane Case), 366 U.S. 316 (1961). See generally Ames, Evidentiary Aspects of
Relevant Product Market Proof in Monopolization Cases, 26 DE PAuL L. REv. 530 (1977).
21. See United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), Maritime Cinema Service Corp. v. Movies En Route, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
22. The defense of superior skill, foresight and, industry was developed by Judge L. Hand
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The defense requires an alleged monopolist to prove'that he attained his market position solely through
business acumen and without any unlawful intent to capture the particular market he dominates.
23. No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969). For a history of the pretrial maneuvering see [1977] 4 TADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1145,070 (Case 2039).
24. Pretrial Order No. 1, United States v. IBM Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 200 Civ. 69, entered
March 16, 1972). See United States v. IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 189 (S.M.N.Y. 1974).
25. 1976 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 322, Table C-5A. Government antitrust cases
average fifteen months from filing until termination compared with six months average
termination time for government civil actions.
26. Id. One hundred twenty-five private antitrust suits were tried in fiscal year 1976.
27. 1976 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 312-13, Table C-4. Of the 1252 private antitrust suits terminated in fiscal year 1976, oVer one-third were terminated without court action
and another third were terminated before pre-trial proceedings but under court supervision.
28. Id. at 183, Table 22. As of June 30, 1976, there were 562 antitrust cases over three
years old still pending before the district courts. These cases represent six percent of the "old
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The intricate nature of' the antitrust laws necessarily leads to voluminous
discovery and extensive factual inquiry in many instances. Nevertheless, current
trends in litigation and legal commentary indicate that district courts allow
unnecessary discovery.2 9 By focusing on the discovery concept of relevancy as a
discretionary judicial tool, the district courts could provide essential relief
within the existing federal rules.
DisCOVERY UNDER THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

These rules govern the procedure of the United States district court in
all suits of a civil nature.... They should be construed to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. 30
The modern Rules evolved from a dissatisfaction with the technical complexities of common law pleading and the limitation of equity discovery which
often resulted in trial by surprise. 31 As a result, the federal system adopted
notice pleading which requires that the claimant make a short and concise
statement upon which relief can be based3 2 and which also gives his opponent
adequate notice to prepare his defense.3 3 Consequently, issue definition was
shifted from the pleading stage to discovery. The modern Rules have been
liberally construed since their adoption resulting in a greater number of suits
that survive well past the pleading stage. The liberal treatment of the Rules
has also led to broad discovery, with the scope limited mainly by the
34
amorphous concept of relevance.
cases" while antitrust filings averaged only one to one and a half percent of all filings in the
district courts from 1971 to 1976. As observed by the Judicial Conference of the United
States: "Total antitrust filings climbed to 1555 cases by 1976. These cases represented only 1.2
percent of the total civil filings in that year; however, as a class they probably represent the
single most time consuming category of cases handled by the U.S. district courts."
Antitrust filings increased from 420 in fiscal year 1961 to 1555 in fiscal year 1976. The increase over fiscal year 1975 was 8.7 percent. Id. at 173, Table 17. Surprisingly, the length of
antitrust trials is not inordinately long with only 25 percent requiring over 10 days. Id. at 333,
Table C-8.
29. See National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Pound Conference];
Symposium, Discovery in Civil Antitrust Suits, 44 A.B.A. ANTrrRUsT L.J. 1 (1975).
30. FED. R. CI. P. 1.
31. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 514 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring); K. RAGLAND,
DiscovERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932).

32. FED. R. Civ. P. 8: "A pleading... shall contain ... a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See also Fulton Co. v. Beain dePoulan, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 604 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (antitrust suit with 21 page complaint deemed
excessively long).
33. See Hickman v. Taylor, j129 U.S. 495, 501 (1947); 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRA CrE f126.02,
at 26-61 to 64 (2d ed. 1976). The Rules provide for interrogatories (FED. R. Civ. P. 33),
depositions (FED. R. Civ. P. 30, 31), requests for documents (FED. R. Civ. P. 34), and pre-trial
conferences (FED. R. Civ. P. 36). FED. R. Civ. P. 37 provides for sanctions for failure to comply
with discovery.
34. A premise inherent in the rules is that discovery should proceed without court involvement. However, the opposite philosophy is adopted by the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrrGATION §1.10 (Moore's ed. 1977).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol30/iss4/4

6

Despriet:
Improved
Definition ofQUAGMIRE
Discovery Relevance: A Path Out of the Ant
PROCEDURAL
ANTITRUST
In Hickmanv. Taylor the Supreme Court indicated that the new federal
rules were to be construed broadly and liberally because of their vital role in
trial preparation. 35 Although the case is best known for development of the
work product doctrine,3 6 the philosophical dicta on discovery still serves as a
foundation for liberal discovery attitudes. The Court affirmed this approach in
United States v. Proctor& Gamble Co.,3 7 and added that liberal discovery was
intended to make trial a fair contest by fully disclosing the basic issues and facts
prior to trial.
The liberal philosophy encouraged by the Supreme Court has pervaded
subsequent judicial interpretation of the Rules. Specifically, the scope of dis-

covery has been broadly interpreted. As a result, the concept of relevance has
remained undefined and inefficient as a limiting force in pre-trial discovery.38
RELEvANCE

The concept of relevance is incorporated in Rule 26(b) to define the scope
of discovery:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.... It is
not grounds for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.3 9

Discovery relevance has not been clearly defined by the courts. 40 Appellate
review and treatment has been sparse due to restrictions on interlocutory
appeals4- and the broad discretion allowed the trial judge in discovery mat35. 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
36. The work product doctrine is now codified in FEm. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3).
37. 356 US. 677 (1958).
38. Summary judgments under Fm. R. Civ. P. 56 are not favored in antitrust suits. In
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464 (1962) the Court reversed the trial
court's summary judgment and said: "We believe that summary procedures should be used
sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof
is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot....
Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which has long been the hallmark of 'even
handed justice."' Id. at 473. See note 45 infra.
39. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1). The portion deleted in the text reads: "[w]hether it relates
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of any discoverable matter."
40. 4 MooRE's FEEr. PRACtncE 26.56[1] at 26-131 (2d ed. 1976).
41. The Interlocutory Appeals Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1291, 1292 (1970) requires that a controlling question of law or fact which would constitute reversible error must form the basis
for any appeal which is not a final judgment. A further complication is introduced by the
Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. §29 (1970) which requires any appeals in government antitrust
suits be taken directly to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. United States, 480 F.2d
293 (2d Cir. 1973) (appellate review of pre-trial orders in government antitrust suit required

by Supreme Court). Cf. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974) (private
plaintiu).
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ters. 42 Further, a party seeking an appeal of a discovery ruling often must incur
great risks. In United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co. 43 the government requested its own dismissal in order to obtain appellate review of a discovery
order. Similarly, in IBM Corp. v. United States44 the defendant was forced to
seek a civil contempt adjudication against itself in order to obtain appellate
review of an adverse discovery determination disallowing a claim of privilege.
The relevance standard of discovery in Rule 26(b) is distinct from the evidentiary standard of relevance. By implication, discovery relevance is not
initially limited to the issues since notice pleading often delays issue definition
until immediately before trial. 45 In reality, discovery is also allowed for threshContributing to the lack of a clear definition of the relevance concept is the wide discretion
allowed the trial judge in pre-trial matters. Justice Harlan saw the issue in Proctor & Gamble,
356 U.S. 677, 685 (1958), solely in terms of the district court's discretion. In his dissent he
pointed out that antitrust cases raise a particular need for the exercise of broad discretion due
to their complexity.
It is important to keep in mind that this discretion is exercised by the district courts in
distinct factual settings and in conjunction with numerous other procedural decisions. Therefore, total objectivity is neither an obtainable nor a desirable goal. Nevertheless, the effects
of antitrust discovery on the parties and the justice system require the most accurate decisions possible.
42. The Pound Conference, supra note 29, led the American Bar Association Section on
Litigation to draft a set of major proposed changes to the discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse proposes
to narrow the scope of discovery outlined in FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The proposed change
would permit discovery only regarding any matter "which is relevant to the issues raised"
rather than the present standard of any matter "which is relevant to the subject matter involved." The committee recognizes that differentiation between "subject matter" and "issues"
will not be easy but recommends the change if only to direct courts to cease erring on the
side of expansive discovery. The issues, according to the proposal, would be defined at a
discovery conference to be incorporated into Rule 26. The discovery conference proposal is:
"After the joinder of issue, the Court shall hold conference on the subject of discovery if
requested by any party. The request for discovery conference shall include: (1) a statement
of issues to be tried; (2) a plan and schedule of discovery; (3) limitations to be placed on
discovery, if any; (4) other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and (5) a certification
that counsel has conferred, or made reasonable effort to confer, with opposing counsel concerning the matters set forth in the request." Lundquist & Schechter, The New Relevancy:
An End to Trial by Ordeal, 64 A.B.A.J. 59, 60 (Jan. 1978). Conferences of a similar nature are
recommended in the FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §0.40
(Moore's ed. 1977). Finding the issues in an antitrust case has been a continual problem. In
K.S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 203 F. Supp. 230, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), the court pointed out
the ease with which pleadings are amended and said: "Rather the problem is to permit a
litigant to obtain whatever information he may need to prepare for the issues that may develop ....
Accord, In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 76 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1977)
(Pre-Trial Order 24). The Supreme Court has upheld broad general antitrust complaints
which did not define the issues on the ground that private antitrust litigants are favored by
Congress. Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). Accord, United States v.
Employing Lathers Ass'n of Chicago, 347 U.S. 198 (1954). See also Nagler v. Admiral Corp.,
248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957).
43. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
44. 493 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1973).
45. A movement for more specific pleading took place in the Southern District of New
York in the 1950's. District judges began dismissing complaints that did not raise specific
issues. Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 144 F. Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), revd, 248 F.2d 319 (2d
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old matters including jurisdiction, class action certification, and indispensable
and necessary party questions.46
Trial courts generally make conclusory relevance determinations based on
any one of a number of the most obvious considerations. The pleadings are
often used as a guide as is the status of the case.4 7 Factors such as the time span
of the requested discovery and geographic considerations often come into play.
Occasionally an evaluation of the importance of the information to the party
seeking discovery will be considered as well as the form of the information or
its availability elsewhere.
A showing of relevance can be overruled by the public policy force of privilege 4s and the work product doctrine. The latter concept, developed in Hickman v. Taylor 9 is incorporated in Rule 26(b)(3).50 Privileged information is
excepted from discovery by Rule 26(b)(1). 51 Both privilege and work product
notions are encroachments on the general rule which favors broad discovery;
the underlying social justifications are strong enough to negate the policy of
the Rules which requires disclosure of all probative matters before trial.
Cir. 1957). Accord, Konczakowski v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
United Grocers' Co. v. Sau-Sea Foods, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Baim & Blank
Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Normandie Amusement Corp. v.
Loew's Inc., 140 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
put an end to any notion of special pleading in Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d
Cir. 1957) (Clark, C.J.): "It is true that antitrust litigation may be of wide scope and without
a central point of attack, so that defense must be diffuse, prolonged, and costly. So many defense lawyers have strongly advocated more particularlized pleading in this area of litigation;
and recently judges in the court below have treated it as accepted law that some special
pleading -the extent is left unclear -is required in antitrust cases. But it is quite'clear that.
the federal rules contain no special exceptions for antitrust cases." Id. at 322-23. Compare
Dawson, The Place of the Pleading in a ProperDefinition of the Issues in the "Big Case," 23
F.R.D. 430 (1958) with Clark, Comment on Judge Dawson'sPaper on the Place of the Pleading
in a ProperDefinition of the Issues in the "Big Case," 23 F.R.D. 435 (1958). See generally

Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45 (1957). For a contrary view, see Armstrong, The Use of Pretrial and Discovery Rules: Expedition and Economy in Federal Civil

Cases, 43 AB.AJ. 693, 696 (1957).
46. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974); Littlejohn v. Shell Oil
Co., 456 F.2d225 (5th Cir. 1972). See also 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcricE f[26.56[l] at 26-117 (2d
ed. 1976). There is some disagreement on whether impeachment evidence is relevant. C~mpare
Burns v. Phillips, 50 F.R.D. 187 (N.J. Ga. 1970) (impeachment evidence not discoverable)
with United States v. IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (discovery for impeachment
purposes only allowed). There is also uncertainty as to whether or not the motive for bringing suit is relevant. See, e.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1972 Trade Cases 273,784 (E.D. Pa.
1971) (some inquiry into plaintiff's motive allowed but what the garbage man had to say
about the suit was not relevant). See also Foremost Promotions, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 15
F.R.D. 128 (N.D. Ill. 1953). But see Stella v. Kaiser, 87 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); 4 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTicE 226.56[2] at 26-157 (2d ed. 1976).
47. See, e.g., Waldrong v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72 (1964), afJ'd, 361 F,2d
671, aff'd sub nom, First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968)
(denied additional discovery where discovery granted conformed with allegations). But see
notes 42 &45 supra.
48. See, e.g., United States v. IBM Corp., 60 F.R.D. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).

49. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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In most types of federal cases, clear parameters of the limits of discovery are
not required. Overly broad discovery arising from a liberal judicial attitude
usually does not impose a tremendous burden on the parties. However, in an
antitrust suit, any unjustified expansion of discovery can lead to disaster for a
party and a resulting frustration of the antitrust laws.
RELEVANCY CONSIDERATIONS IN ANTITRUST CASES

For purposes of this note, factors involved in relevancy determinations will
be classified as internal and external considerations.-2 Internal considerations
are those that concern the subject matter that the court has squarely before it.
They are primarily legal considerations, derived mainly from pleadings,
answers, defenses, jurisdictional claims and other matters which can directly
affect the court's decision in the case. External considerations include matters
that have an indirect effect on the litigation and either an indirect or direct
effect on the parties.
An example of both internal and external considerations at work in a
relevancy determination can be found in Carlson Co., Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson, Inc., 53 where the plaintiff alleged an illegal tying of trading stamps to
financing provided by the stamp company. The plaintiff objected to a broad
discovery request seeking the details of its internal operations. The discovery
motion was based on the defendant's need to prove that poor management
alone caused the plaintiff's business failure. In limiting allowable discovery,
the court noted that the marginal enhancement of the objectives of providing
information or narrowing the issues (internal consideration) had to be weighed
the party from whom the information was sought (exagainst the hardship of
54
ternal consideration).
Supreme Court dicta in Hickman v. Taylor5s and the underlying philosophy
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure focus on the internal considerations of
providing information and avoiding surprise at trial. 50 This has led to a
preponderance of internal considerations which, in most cases, produces
equitable results. However, the external effects of discovery in antitrust proceedings are consistently more onerous due to the massive amount of information which is potentially relevant to the subject matter of the suit. The

52. The classification is analogous to the endogenous and exogenous variable dichotomy
used in modern decision theory. For an example of complete integration of decision theory
with legal analysis, see Horowitz, Decision Theory and Antitrust: Quantitative Evaluation for
Efficient Enforcement, 52 IND. L.J. 713 (1977).
53. 374 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Minn. 1973).
54. Id. at 1088. See also Uniled States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 13 F.R.D. 98
1952).
(N.D. Ill.
55. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
56. The Court stated: "The new rules ... invest the deposition-discovery process with a
vital role in the preparation for trial.... Thus civil trials in the federal courts no longer need
be carried on in the dark." Hiclunan v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). The Court added:
"We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment. No longer can the time honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude
a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case." Id. at 507.
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prospect of expansive and expensive discovery can lead to abandonment of the
suit or a settlement totally unrelated to the merits. 57
The major source of internal considerations is the complaint. In private
antitrust suits it is common to allege multiple antitrust violations which, at the
outset, gives the subject matter of the suit a broad scope. A party is able to
maintain a wide range of inquiry due to judicial reluctance to dismiss an antitrust plaintiff or to force a narrowing of the complaint. 8 Some dissatisfaction
with this approach developed during the early fifties in the Southern District
of New York where antitrust plaintiffs who could not plead with greater
particularity were dismissed. 59 However, in Nagler v. Admiral Corp.0 the
Second Circuit decided that the liberal foundation of the modem rules were
not to be applied differently in antitrust litigation even though the allegations
"may be of wide scope and without a central point of attack, causing defense
to be diffuse, prolonged and costly." 6' Thus, the subject matter of the suit, as
described in the complaint, has remained of negligible consequence as a limiting internal consideration in antitrust suits.
The result of using the virtually unrestricted subject matter consideration
is the abandonment of the method of writing a complaint by shaping pertinent
facts to predefined legal principles. Instead, it is not uncommon in antitrust
for a plaintiff to search for all possible facts, only then considering legal categories into which they should be grouped. 62 This problem is compounded by
the uncertainty of the substantive law. A court uncertain of the economic effect
57. Expansive discovery is both a defensive and offensive problem. Cases where the plaintiffs' discovery request had a high potential for external effect and cessation of proceedings
are Shotkin v. General Electric Co., 171 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1948); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cases f61,743 (N.D. IM. 1977); Allied Electric Supply Co. v.
Motorola, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Doglow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 661 (ED.

N.Y. 1971); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964); Pappas v. Loew's,
Inc., 13 F.R.D. 471 (M.D. Pa. 1953). The defendant also has the capability of frustrating the
plaintiff with massive requests. See, e.g., In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation, 1974-2
Trade Cases ff75,209 (ED. Pa. 1974); United States v. IBM Corp., 66 F.RD. 189 (SD.N.Y.
1974); Carlson Companies, Inc. v. The Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Minn.
1974); Amherst Leasing Corp. v. Emhart Corp., 65 F.R.D. 121 (D. Conn. 1974); Columbia

Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Artists &Publishers, 400 F. Supp.
737 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Natcontainer Corp. v. Continental Can Co., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1094

(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
58. In Brett v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 461 F.2d 1155, 1157 (5th Cir. 1972), the

court said that the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in antitrust suits "should not
be sustained unless it appears to a certainty, that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim that would entitle him to relief." See also Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1974). Withrow & Latin, The "BigAntitrust Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean Labor, 62 CoRNE L. RV. 1, 23 (1976). In Allied
Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Pa. 1973) the court expressed grave
doubt that the Sherman Act §2 claim (monopoly) had any merit. However, because the
Sherman Act, §1 claim (combination in restraint of trade) was not being dismissed, the
monopolization allegation would be allowed to stand during discovery.
59. See note 45 supra.
60. 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957).
61. Id. at 322. Clark, C.J., who wrote the opinion, was one of the principal draftsmen of
the modem Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
62. See text accompanying note 90 infra.
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or behavior required to be proven will be more lenient in granting discovery
63
requests that could lead to any potentially important data.
More concrete relevancy considerations involve time and geography. In
antitrust cases, allegations of conspiracies of local effect are sometimes used as
a springboard for national discovery. However, in William Goldman Theatres,
Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.64 the court found that interrogatories inquiring into nationwide activities were irrelevant when the proponent was
trying to support a counterclaim involving a purely local conspiracy. The
court directed that the interrogatories be limited to areas of "geographic
relevance."65

Time was an important relevancy consideration in ProfessionalAdjusting
Systems of America, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc.66 where the court
took great care in limiting the plaintiff's discovery to the 1964-1974 time frame
rather than granting discovery back to 1952 as requested. Time frames are
especially vital in antitrust claims where it is easy to allege conspiracies of long
duration or corporate monopoly behavior amounting to an attempt to monop67
olize as prohibited by Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

A New York federal court faced such a Section 2 allegation in Natcontainer
Corp. v. Continental Can Co., Inc.6 s The court held that plaintiff's interrogatories requesting information from 1944 to 1973 were relevant even though the
defendant had only been in the business it was allegedly attempting to monopolize since 1956. The court reasoned that the history of the defendant corporation would illuminate the illegality of any monopolizing behavior.9 No reason
was given why adequate information could not have been obtained solely from
behavior which had taken place since the plaintiff and defendant had been
competing.7 0 Although the assertions of the need for discovery in both Pro63.

But see text accompanying note 85 infra. Judge Wyzanski admitted that there was

some uncertainty in cases involving §2 of the Sherman Act but nevertheless criticized "the
Government's unnecessary volume of exhibits disclosing chiefly the Department of Justice's
unwillingness to accept the notion that in the second half of this Century lower Courts,
educated by the Supreme Court, can get the point that an antitrust case really turns on a
relatively manageable set of facts, on a few by now clear legal issues, and on a presentation
worthy of Mr. Justice Holmes' advice to 'strike for the jugular.'" United States v. Grinnell,
Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 258-59 (D. R.I. 1964). Conspiracy allegations also provide a springboard for broad discovery. See First Delaware Valley Citizens Television, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.,
1975-2 Trade Cases 60,675 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
64. 54 F.R.D. 201 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
65. Accord, Professional Adjusting Systems of America, Inc. v. General Adjustment
Bureau, 373 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Konszakowski v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 20
F.R.D. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Contra, Burroughs v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 491
(D. Mass. 1952).
66. 373 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
67. 15 U.S.C. §2 (1970).
68. 362 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
69. Accord, Maritime Cinera Service Corp. v. Movies En Route, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
70. See also Burroughs v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 491 (D. Mass. 1952),
where the complaint alleged that local activities of defendants were part of a nationwide
conspiracy to monopolize the motion picture industry. The court allowed interrogatories on
the size of the defendants, their integration at the national level and the relationship be-
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fessional Adjusting Systems and Natcontainerwere substantially identical, the

court in Natcontainerfelt that even a remote chance of enhancing the plaintiff's case was sufficient justification for extensive pre-complaint discovery. The

limiting of discovery to more material time frames is the better reasoned approach as it incorporates concern for the party from whom discovery is re-

quested and is more compatible with an efficient resolution of the case.
On occasion, courts go beyond the subject matter of the suit in making
relevancy determinations and consider the stage of the proceedings. In Rutledge v. ElectricHose 6 Rubber Co. 7 1 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held

that the court below did not abuse its discretion by fixing a time limit for
completion of plaintiff's discovery in a price discrimination suit. The court
reasoned that fifteen months after the filing of the complaint was adequate
time to complete discovery in view of the status of the case and the information
already discovered.
Issues that have been previously decided have also been considered as a
factor in limiting discovery. An example is found in First National Bank of
Arizona v. British Petroleum Co., 72 a Sherman Act Section 1 suit in its fifteenth
year of discovery. The fourth trial judge in the case refused to allow a discovery
request which involved an eight year old standing issue that had previously
been decided.
The form of requested information may also be an important internal consideration. For instance, a party may not request statistical compilations from
an opponent when the party making the request can derive the information
himself from books and records that are discoverable73 In antitrust suits, sta-

tistical economic information plays an important role and the courts take into
consideration the burden of proof and evidentiary implications when assign-

tween them. The court reasoned that it is sufficient that information sought will lead to
evidence material to the matter sought to be proved. Of course, such a statement could be
made as to any inquiry. Cf. Foremost Promotions, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 15 F.R.D. 128
(N.D. Ill. 1953). "Of course, the question concerning anything under the sun might lead to a
chain reaction in the witness' mind which might develop relevant testimony or lead to a
substantial clue to relevant testimony." Id. at 130.
71. 511 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1975). In connection with this case, related criminal and civil
action had been going on for twelve years. The plaintiff had complained that the time limit
established gave it only one month after the last answer was filed for discovery. The court
held that dilatory activity on the part of one party is no excuse for clear-cut dilatory activity
on the part of the other.
72. 324 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
73. FED. R. Crv. P. 33(c) (Option to Produce Business Records). Where the answer to an
interrogatory may be derived or ascertained from the business records of the party upon
whom the interrogatory has been served or from an examination, audit or inspection of such
business records, or from a complication, abstract or summary based thereon, and the burden
of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially the same for the party serving the
interrogatory as for the party served, it is a sufficient answer to such interrogatory to specify
the records from which the answer may be derived or ascertained and to afford to the party
serving the interrogatory reasonable opportunity to examine, audit or inspect such records
and to make copies, compilations, abstracts or summaries. See also FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1),
note 39 supra.
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ing the onerous task of data assimilation. However, as in other areas of
relevancy determination, decisions in this area are not consistent. 74
In relatively simple cases, a focus solely on internal considerations usually
produces satisfactory results. In contrast, external considerations have greater
significance in antitrust litigation. For this reason, the courts must look beyond
traditional internal considerations. However, despite the general outcry against
massive antitrust litigation, the judiciary remains reluctant to incorporate
many external considerations into antitrust relevancy determinations. 5
The major external factor which is considered by the courts is the general
concept of burden. Burden includes expense to the party from whom discovery
is requested. Burden, like relevance, is a relative concept which involves a subjective evaluation by the courts.7 6 The Federal Rules have formally incorpo74. In United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 13 F.R.D. 98 (N.D. Ill. 1952) the
court felt that the work in compiling statistics was a proper consideration in determining the
propiety of interrogatories and held that the total purchase of tires by General Motors Corp.
from U.S. Rubber from 1920 to 1948 was relevant. However, requiring a separation of total
sales into classes of tires and tubes or subdivisions of automobile classes would be irrelevant
for the Government's purpose of showing the anticompetitive effects of DuPont's control
over both companies. Accord, Pappas v. Loew's, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 471 (M.D. Pa. 1953) (where
records have been produced for copying and inspection, interrogatories requiring compilation
of information are improper). But see Morgan Smith Automotive Products, Inc. v. General
Motors Corp., 54 F.R.D. 19 (E.D. Pa. 1971), where the defendant's objection to plaintiff's
interrogatories on the basis of having to sift through thousands of documents was overruled
with the defendant being required not only to sift but also compile relevant data into usable
form.

75. The FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrrIGATIoN (Moore's ed. 1977)
is a guide developed by the Federal Judicial Center for the management of complex cases,
primarily antitrust and copyright. It offers many suggestions for expeditious handling of a
complex case from a managerial viewpoint. Numerous pre-trial conferences and organization
of discovery into waves are recommended. However, little guidance is offered on limiting the
bounds of discovery. The manual mentions solely internal consideration and advises the judge
to consider time and subject matter limitations and not to allow discovery on "irrelevant" or
uncontroverted facts. Id. §2.40.
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (Protective Orders). Upon motion by a party or by the person
from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where
the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including
one or more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may
be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by
the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope
of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one
present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after being sealed be
opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated
way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in
sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977); Blank v. Talley Industries, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 627
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Morgan Smith Automotive Products, Inc. v. General Motors, 54 F.R.D. 19
(E.D. Pa. 1971); William Goldman Theatres v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 54 F.R.D. 201 (E.D.
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rated this consideration as a counterweight to relevance. For example, Rule
33(c) gives a party the option to produce business records in lieu of answers to
interrogatories where the burden of deriving the answers from those records is
77
comparable for both parties.
The weighing of burden in antitrust cases was explicitly recognized in
Dolgow v. Anderson8 as part of an affirmative duty by the court to supervise
and limit discovery to protect parties and witnesses from annoyance and excessive expense. The court reasoned that the possibility of abuse is especially
high in lengthy and complex antitrust cases. Although not discussed in terms
of relevance, the court's use of external considerations had the same limiting
effect as if the interrogatories had been deemed irrelevant.
Public policy is often interjected into the antitrust discovery
process as an
expansive consideration. The public policy factor can tip the scales of relevancy
in favor of discovery in spite of an obviously burdensome request. For example,
in United States v. IBM Corp.79 the potential economic impact of the case led
the trial court to allow immense discovery unimpeded by relevancy or burden
considerations. Furthermore, the court has taken a restrictive view of privilege
and work product claims. 80
An important external policy consideration not linked to antitrust policy
was evaluated in conjunction with relevance in United States v. Proctor &
Gamble Co.81 The defendant sought disclosure of grand jury proceedings which
were being used by the government in preparation for its civil suit. The Court
overruled the trial court's grant of wholesale discovery on the ground that no
compelling necessity had been shown to overcome the government's need for
secrecy of grand jury proceedings. In an analogous situation, the district court
in Estate of LeBaron v. Rohm & Haas Co.82 denied four requests for discovery
of defendants' profit margins in an antitrust suit alleging a combination in
restraint of trade.s The trial court held that the profit figures were sensitive
competitive information." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held
Pa. 1971); United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 107 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
77. See Pappas v. Loew's, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 471 (M.D. Pa. 1953).
78. 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D. N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972).
79. No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 1969). See note 24 supra. The government is
seeking divestiture of the corporate giant.
80. Discovery decisions reflecting the attitude of the court are at 76 F.R.D. 97 (S.DN.Y.
1977); 1977-2 Trade Cases ff61,622 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (impeachment evidence must be disclosed); 72 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (defendant's additional discovery motion denied); 539
F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976) (dismissing appeal); 71 F.R.D. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (third party discovery motions); 70 F.R.D. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (protective order denied); 67 F.R.D. 40
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (protection of nonparty exhibits denied); 66 F.R.D. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(plaintiff granted discovery of third party financial data); 66 F.R.D. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(government discovery orders granted); 66 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (attorney-client privilege); 60 F.R.D. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (defendant held in civil contempt for nonproduction of
documents); 58 F.R.D. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (IBM held to have violated document protection
order); 1973 Trade Cases 174,381 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (claim of privilege denied).
81. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
82. 441 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1971).
83. Id. at 577.

84. Id.
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that denial was reversible error even though the court felt that the information
would not likely be admissible under evidentiary relevance standards. 5 The
court reached its conclusion while admitting that the necessary explanation of
profit margins would most likely be disproportionate to the probative value of
the indirect circumstantial evidences6 and without explaining how the discovery of inadmissible evidence would alter the judgment on remand. Thus,
the result in LeBaron is an extreme example of allowing discovery of information that could only have had a tenuous bearing on the resolution of the suit.
In this case it appears that internal considerations emanating from the general
subject matter of the suit prevailed over the reality of the need for confidentiality of competitive information.
Since ninety percent of all antitrust suits never reach trial, the external
effects of antitrust discovery appear more outcome determinative than does the
information actually discovered.8

7

The courts are cognizant of the impact of

antitrust discovery on the results of litigation; yet this awareness is rarely re88
flected in relevance determinations.
THE ExTERNAL REALITIES OF ANTrRusT DIscovERY

This Court is mindful that in recent years antitrust litigation, particularly Government civil actions alleging violations of §2 of the
Sherman Act, have involved an enormous, nearly cancerous, growth of
exhibits, depositions and ore tenus testimony. Few judges who have sat
in such cases had attempted to digest the plethora of evidence, or indeed
could do so and at the same time do justice to other litigation in their
courts. Nor is there any sound reason to believe that such extensive
presentation accomplishes any important legal or other social end. 9
Admittedly, the courts need not examine the motive of a party requesting
discovery due to the complexity of such an inquiry. Rather, the courts should
concentrate on the indirect effects of granting a discovery request. In In re
Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation- though it recognized the inherent
discovery difficulties of antitrust litigation, the court dismissed the plaintiff's
claim for failure to comply with a discovery order.91 The court conceded the
fact that the defendants and their counsel had the advantages over the plaintiff
85.
86.

Id. at 57.
Id.

87. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
88. See Quonset Real Estate Corp. v. Paramount Film. Distrib. Corp., 50 F.R.D. 240
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court granted discovery of the defendant's activities antedating the
earliest possible antitrust violation by ten years. Nevertheless, the court said: "The Court is,
of course, not unmindful of the fact that the liberal deposition procedure provided in the
Federal Rules is often used not for the purpose for which it is intended, but rather as a
litigation tactic to harass opponents and cause them wasteful expense in the hope of obtaining favorable settlements." Id. at 242.
89. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 247 (D. R.I. 1964) (Wyzanski, J.).
90. 63 F.R.D. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (J.P.M.D.L. 119), rev'd, 531 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir.), rei'd
per curiam, 427 U.S. 639 (1976). The Supreme Court felt that FED. R. Civ. P. 37 dismissal
sanction was appropriate due to its deterrent value.
91. Dismissed with prejudice pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
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in capabilities, numbers and unlimited financial resources. 92 Nevertheless, the
extensive interrogatories propounded by the defendants were considered vital

to the defense even though ultimately fatal to the plaintiff.
Such overt judicial recognition of external realities is the exception rather
than the rule. Still, the effect of discovery is the major problem in antitrust
litigation today. Incorporating these effects into relevancy decision-making is
both appropriate and within the discretion given the courts under the rules.
Appropriate inquiry in the area of external considerations involves identification of external benefits which accrue to the party seeking discovery. Once

identified, factors can then be evaluated and given appropriate weight in the
final decision. For example, undue delay of an antitrust case can result in

continuation of mon6poly produced or otherwise tainted profits.93 When a
violation of the antitrust laws is alleged, accrual of illegal profits can be a

substantial factor moving a defendant to promote prodigious discovery which
can cause litigation to continue for years. Another possible effect of prolonging
litigation is to prevent subsequent suits against a defendant. 94 Potential plaintiffs may take a "wait and see" attitude on an initial-suit, especally a government suit, which can provide prima fade proof of a violation for subsequent
private plaintiffs.95 Even if the initial suit is by a private plaintiff, other potential plaintiffs may wish to avoid becoming entangled in multi-district liti-

gation, thereby losing their choice of forum.96 In the extreme situation, po-

tential plaintiffs may be on the verge of business failure and a delay will, for
all practical purposes, eliminate this future claimant. 97 The irony of this situa-

tion is even greater when alleged antitrust violations are responsible for the
impending business failure. Delay of an antitrust action may also benefit the
plaintiff by preventing the defendant from bringing a counter suit. Grounds
for suit may have been discovered during extensive discovery in the original
suit, but the defendant may be foreclosed from filing a counterclaim in that
92. Id. at 642.
93. The treble damage provisions of §4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §15 (1970) theoretically has the penalty effect which will cause the guilty monopolist to disgorge ill-gotten
gains. See Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have

Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D.

199 (1976).
94. After a Justice Department civil and criminal price-fixing suit against 23 corporations
and fifty executives in the folding carton industry, 1976-2 Trade Cases ff61,190 (N.D. Ill.
1976), resulted in acceptance of nolo contetidere pleas and acquiescence to a consent decree,
more than fifty private suits were filed. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2
Trade Cases 161,743 (N.D. II. 1977).
95. 15 U.S.C. §16(a) (1970). "A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered
in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the
antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party against
such defendant under said laws." See generally Steinhouse, The Effect of Justice Department
and FTC Cases on Private Antitrust Litigation, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 490 (1973).

96. See, e.g., Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 1973-1 Trade Cases 74,363 (D. Minn. 1973)
(discusses Telex Corporation's resistance to a transfer from Oklahoma District Court to the
Minnesota District Court for consolidation of pretrial discovery).
97. See, e.g., In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation, 63 F.R.D. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1944)
(J.P.M.D.L. 119), rev'd, 531 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (plaintiffs failure to comply with discovery requests due, in part, to insolvency).
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suit due to a general reluctance by the courts and parties to further complicate
already complex litigation.
A plaintiff may bring an antitrust suit for the sole purpose of gaining information that would not be discoverable if the suit were brought under a
different legal theory. In Searer v. West Michigan Telecasters, Inc.98 the plaintiff alleged violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.9 9 The court granted summary judgment for the defendants based on the fact that no per se antitrust
offense or specific anticompetitive intent had been alleged. 00° The plaintiff
claimed that he was denied sufficient discovery before summary judgment was
granted. With unusual candor the court observed:
What is painfully obvious from the history of this case is that the plaintiff is straining to fit within antitrust mold grievances which are of a
quite different sort. His litany of the defendant's wrongs includes conduct which might be characterized as unfair, unethical, violative of FCC
regulations, fraudulent and tortious. However he makes the common
mistake that such conduct when undertaken in a business setting automatically qualifies as a violation of the antitrust laws. 101
There are, of course, more apparent tactical reasons for abusing discovery.
For example, tying up a plaintiff's counsel and limited resources in the litigation can eventually result in dismissal with prejudice. Since there can be scores
of parties on either side of an antitrust suit, requests for information from each
party compounds the problem of broad discovery. 1° 2 An additional external
benefit available to any party is the discovery of trade secrets. Rule 26(c). 03
recognizes the need for consideration of trade secrets in issuing protective
orders, but the courts have been reluctant to deny requests for relevant competitive information. 04
98. 381 F. Supp. 634 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
99. 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970).
100. Searer v. West Mich. Telecasters, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 634, 640 (W.D. Mich. 1974). The
court found that the inconsequential interstate commerce effect was inadequate to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of the antitrust laws and there was no causal link between the
alleged restraint of trade and plaintiff's damages.
101. Id. at 642. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 474 (1962)
(Harlan, J., dissenting): "As I see it, this is one of those cases, not unfamiliar in treble-damage
litigation, where injury resulting from normal business hazards is sought to be made redressable by casting the affair in antitrust terms." See also Ace Beer Distributors, Inc. v. Kohn,
Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1963); Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Imported Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp.
499 (E.D. Mich. 1974); B&B Oil & Chem. Co. v. Franklin Oil Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D.
Mich. 1968). Compare Oak Distributing Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 370 F. Supp. 889 (E.D.
Mich. 1973) with Allied Electric Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
102. See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litiagation, 1977-2 Trade Cases 61,743
(N.D. Ill. 1977); Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 74 F.R.D.
439 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defendant requested broad discovery from 35 plaintiffs).
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See note 76 supra.
104. See Maritime Cinema Service Corp. v. Movies En Route, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), where the court overruled an objection to discovery based on trade secrets and reasoned
that antitrust actions probe matters at the heart of business dealings and competitive relationships and that any harm resulting from disclosure was a by-product of competition.
Accord, In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cases ff61,743 (N.D. Ill.
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Extensive discovery can also have a damaging effect on a party's business
operations.105 Cognizant that the date of the complaint does not necessarily
establish a cut-off date for antitrust discovery, a corporate defendant may delay
new projects or resort to less than ethical means to secure the competitive advantage which normally accrues to a market innovator. If any idea, strategy or
product is past incipiency, settlement may be the only alternative to losing
industrial security. Disruption of normal operations through lengthy depositions of key personnel, the massive search of records and the presence of the
opponent-competitor or his counsel also adversely impact on operations.'0
Massive discovery can become counter-productive in the search for the truth
by obscuring the issues. As Judge Wyzanski observed in United States v. Grin0
nell Corp.,1
7 it is almost impossible for a judge, let alone a jury, to digest too
much information. ° s Only through cooperation between the opponents can
such voluminous presentations be avoided. For example, the effective use of
stipulations enabled the Grinnell court to expeditiously resolve the case at
trial, despite over 8,000 pages of depositions, 400 pages of pre-trial briefs, and
1181 trial exhibits totaling 15,000 pages.109 Sheer manageability and comprehension problems inherent in prolific presentations can thwart fair determination. As noted by Judge Wyzanski, "nor is there any sound reason to believe
that such extensive presentation accomplishes any important legal or other
social end."110
One external policy consideration used to justify private plaintiffs' extensive discovery has been the important role of private action in the enforcement of the antitrust laws.'11 This view stems from the fact that these plaintiffs
1977); United States v. IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Carlson Co. v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Minn. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 507 F.2d 959
(8th Cir. 1974); Jad Corp. of America v. Hico Corp. of America, 1973-1 Trade Cases ff74,395
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Brother Int'l Corp., 191 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
105. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Court limited
the standing requirements for securities fraud plaintiffs, using discovery's in terrorem potential as partial justification. The Court said: "The prospect of extensive deposition of the
defendant's officers and associates and the concomitant opportunity for extensive discovery
of business documents is a common occurrence in this and similar types of litigation ... .
[rio the extent that it permits a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim to simply take up
the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an 'in terrorem'
increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded hope that the process
will reveal relevant evidence, it is a social cost rather than a benefit." Id. at 741.
106. See Note, Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 YALE
LJ.117 (1949). During pretrial discovery between IBM and Control Data Corporation, IBM

copied or microfilmed 80 million Control Data documents while Control Data had a staff of
61 personnel in IBM's offices inspecting and copying documents. See IBM Corp. v. United
States, 493 F.2d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974) (dissent).
107. 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964).
108. Parties receiving expansive discovery are becoming technology-minded and using
computers and clerical staffs to assimilate and organize mountains of data. See Halverson,
Coping with the Fruits of Discovery in the Complex Case -The System's Approach to
Litigation Support, 44 A.B.A. ANtrrrusT L.J. 39 (1976). See also Control Data Corp. v. IBM
Corp., 1973-1 Trade Cases f74,363 (D. Minn. 1973).
109. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244,247 (D.R.I. 1964).
110. Id.

111. The Supreme Court has at numerous times reiterated the importance of private

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

19

Florida
Law Review,
Vol.REVIEW
30, Iss. 4 [1978], Art.[Vol.
4
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW

XXX

serve as private attorneys general to supplement the efforts of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission. However, the reverse consideration is also valid. That is, if the policy of the antitrust laws has been vindicated
through a prior government suit, the private plaintiff is only vindicating his
own rights in the form of triple damages; thus, he should not be given the
added favorable inference of private attorney general. Public policy may be
used justifiably to help private plaintiffs survive dismissal and summary judgment motions. However, these policy considerations should be carefully evaluated before they are applied to aid private plaintiffs in obtaining expensive
112
discovery.
IMPROVED DEFINITION OF RELEVANCE - JUSTIFICATION AND
RATIONALE FOR EXTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS IN A
COMPREHENSIVE RELEVANCE CONCEPT

Procedure must have the capacity of flexible adjustment to changing
groups of facts. The law of discovery has been invested at times with unnecessary mystery. There are few fields where considerations of practical
convenience should
play a larger role. The rationale of the remedy..
113
is simplicity itself.

An interesting exception to the predominance of internal considerations in
relevancy determinations was provided by the Supreme Court in FirstNational
Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co." 4 The case, which was in its fifteenth year
of pre-trial proceedings, was on certiorari due to the dismissal of one of the ten
defendant oil companies which had allegedly been involved in a Sherman Act
Section 1115 conspiracy. Although the decision did not focus on relevance as a
concept, the Court detailed the lengthy history of the case and its slow discovery process. 116 Depositions had taken over five and one half years to complete with the acquiescence and, occasionally, at the prompting of the plaintiff."1 The Court held that further discovery requested by the plaintiff to
counter the motion for summary judgment was no doubt relevant but properly
denied when the history of the litigation and the conduct of the plaintiff was
considered." 8 The explicit recognition that the suit had become unmanageable
plaintiffs in the enforcement of the antitrust laws. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958). Accord, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100
(1969); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
Cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (private action
is a deterrent to anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws).
But see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (limiting potential private plaintiffs
to direct purchasers of goods sold by price fixer).

112. See Kirham, Complex Civil Litigation -Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D.
199 (1976).
113. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 693 (1933)
(Cardozo, J.).
114. 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
115. 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970).
116. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 259-63 (1968).
117. Id. at 263.
118. Id. at 294, 298-99.
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was a significant acknowledgment of the external considerations which are at
the core of the antitrust litigation problem.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure incorporate the practicalities of
litigation as well as liberal discovery techniques. Rule 1119 requires that all the
federal rules be construed to allow just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action. The trend in antitrust litigation shows a significant departure
from this policy. The scope of the discovery provisions of Rule 26(b)120 is limited by the protective order provisions of 26(c), 1 21 which allows a court to limit
discovery when good cause is shown in order to protect a party from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense. Nevertheless, prodigious discovery continues. For example, the cost of a discovery request made
by the Justice Department in 1977 was estimated by the defendant at one
1 22
hundred million dollars.
The policy of the antitrust laws themselves has been invoked to require less
strenuous proof at trial. Proof of the amount of damages in private antitrust
suits is one good example. In Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchpnent
Co. 1 23

the Supreme Court reasoned that once the fact of damage was established, the plaintiff should not be held to exacting standards for proving the
actual amount. 24 Partial justification for holding that the circuit court's reVersal of the case was error was that the appellate court's standard of proof
would lead to an undue evidentiary complication.125 Thus, the external need
for expedience was given priority in fashioning a rule of substantive law.
Similarly, in United States v. Topco Associates,126 the Court adopted a new

per se rule outlawing horizontal market divisions of trademarked products.
The justification for the new rule was based in part on the extensive analysis
which would otherwise be required by the Rule of Reason. Predictability and
expedience were the external interests which moved the majority to prohibit
outright the challenged activity.127

The conceptual leap to a comprehensive discovery relevance standard is
eased by parallel processes suited both to evidentiary relevance and discovery
relevance. External considerations have always been included in the concept of
evidentiary relevance to counterbalance the internal consideration of probative value. Proffered evidence which is unquestionably probative may be excluded as irrelevant if the deterimental effects of prejudice, confusion, time
consumption or surprise outweigh the probative value.12s Judicial or legislative
119. FEn. R. Civ. P. 1. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
120. Frn. R. Civ. P. 26(b). See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See note 76 supra.
122. Schellhardt 9- Schorr, Carter's Trustbusters Seek to Speed Cases by Narrowing Line
of Attack in Big Suits, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1978, at 38, col. 2.
123. 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
124. Id. at 563-64.

125. Id. at 567.
126. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
127. Chief Justice Burger did not agree with the justification and felt that the trade restrictions involved should be evaluated by a court on a case-by-case basis. United States v.
Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 613 (1972) (dissent).
128. 2 JoNEs, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EvmENc:, §588, at 1086 (2d ed. 1926).
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clarification of the discovery relevance concept would entail a similar incorporation of such pertinent external considerations.
ADOPTION OF A. COMPREHENSIVE RELEVANCY DOCTR

E

There are two alternatives for adoption of a more realistic relevancy de1 29
cisional model. The first choice involves a change in the Federal Rules incorporating specific parameters for relevancy determinations similar to the use
of protective order criteria in Rule 26(c). 1 30 The change could be made in the
Rules generally without affecting less complex litigation, since the external
considerations attendant to most cases would be given little weight due to the
decreased effect of superfluous discovery.' 3'
An alternative method of adoption is a judicial response to the popular
dissatisfaction with the widespread discovery abuse in antitrust cases. The
power of judicial discretion can be used to initiate adoption of a decision
model for relevancy determinations. 13 2 A conscious judicial evaluation of external as well as internal considerations within a more structured framework
could facilitate consistency and lead to more accurate decisions while preserving the discretionary role of the judge. Discretion would continue to be vital
in the decisional model due to the necessity for evaluating and weighing the
material considerations of each case.
Accurate relevancy decision-making requires comprehensive analysis of all
the material implications of a discovery request. For purposes of developing a
decision model, the decision process can be divided into primary and secondary
analysis. 3 3 Secondary analysis mainly involves the external considerations most
129. It is suggested that the following language be added to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1): In
determining the relevancy of requested discovery, the court will consider whether the materiality of the information requested justifies (I) any delay that the requested discovery may
cause in the proceedings; (2) the potential frustration of national policy; (3) the benefits
accruing to the party requesting discovery that are not related to the subject matter of the
suit; and (4) the expense, disruption and competitive harm the request will inflict on the
opposing party.
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See Lundquist & Schechter, The New Relevancy, An End to
Trial by Ordeal,64 A.B.A.J. 59 (1978). The changes to the rules recommended by the Special
Committee on the Study of Discovery Abuse, American Bar Association Section on Litigation
indicate that a primary reason for changing the scope of discovery from the subject matter to
the issues of the suit is to "direct courts not to continue the present practice of erring on the
side of expansive discovery." Id. at 60.
131. The need for an explicit finding of relevance was recognized by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'g,
1975 Trade Cases 1160,269 (D. Ohio 1975). The court vacated the dismissal of the government's suit because the district court failed to make an explicit relevancy determination. The
appellate court felt that a relevancy determination was a necessary first step in the evaluation
of the government's interest in protecting the confidentiality of documents relating to the
government's investigation of other manufacturers in the boxspring industry.
132. See generally, Symposium, Discovery in Civil Antitrust Suits, 44 A.B.A. ANrrrRusT
L.J. 1, 57 (1975) (panel discussion where panelist Renfrow, J., discusses strong judicial actions
such as placing a straight numerical limit on the number of interrogatories).
133. There is in fact a tertiary analysis which involves fashioning the appropriate order.
See note 143 infra. However, it will be treated as a separate function for the sake of convenience.
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prevalent in antitrust suits; it need not be undertaken unless the court finds a
discovery request potentially burdensome to a party or cumbersome to the
court.

Primary analysis is derived from the Federal Rules and follows current
practice with internal considerations and privilege being the prime components. The first determination is whether the information requested is
relevant within the broad scope of Rule 26(b)(1) 34 and is not redundant or
inappropriate in the particular stage of the proceedings. If the information is
relevant under this standard, an evaluation of any Rule 26 claims of privilege,
including work product, must be undertaken. If the information is possibly
privileged but would not be burdensome to disclose, then a relevance determination can be made by weighing the privilege against the materiality or need
for the information. However, if a claim of burden is raised, further analysis is
necessary, entailing a critical assessment of the degree of relevance, or materiality, to the subject matter of the suit. 35 If the burden on the party from
whom discovery is requested is obviously great and the degree of relevance is at
best marginal, then the request dearly should be denied. However, the nature
of the antitrust laws' -6 and the lack of early issue definition often preclude such
a finding of marginal relevance and excessive burden. Therefore, the external
effects inherent in antitrust discovery necessitate a secondary analysis to consider the vagaries peculiar to complex litigation.
An initial and important external consideration is the caveat of Rule 1'
which requires the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the action.
Closely linked to the policy of Rule 1 are other public policy considerations
such as the economic impact of the suit. Standards to be applied will vary; the
just, speedy and inexpensive yardstick for a government divestiture suit will be
different from the measure used in a price discrimination suit by a grocery
store against a local producer.
Perhaps the most important secondary external consideration is the-effect
on antitrust policy. If a private plaintiff is involved, his preferential treatment
should be tempered by the true extent to which his action is furthering the
public interest. If the government has already been successful in stopping the
anticompetitive behavior at issue, the punitive effect of triple damages may not
vest a private plaintiff with extra discovery rights under the guise of a private
attorney general. His public function should be de-emphasized whether he is
seeking discovery or is resisting a defensive discovery request. The antitrust
policy considerations are most important in multi-district litigation where the
large number of parties precludes bestowing each plaintiff with special status. 38
134. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
135. Some courts have carefully evaluated the degree of relevancy. See United States v.
Ciba Corp., 1973-2 Trade Cases ff74,603 (D.N.J. 1978); Carlson Co. v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Minn. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 507 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1974);
Foremost Promotions, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 15 F.R.D. 128 (N.D. I1. 1953).
136. See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
137. FED. P. Civ. P. 1.
138. In a recent suit involving player contracts, discovery was permitted into the managerial and financial affairs of all twenty-six defendant professional teams on the theory that
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The external effect of the disclosure of trade secrets or confidential competitive information is often a material consideration which requires close scrutiny
of objections of the adverse party. Obtaining such information is a secondary
benefit which should not accrue to a party unless there is compelling justification.a9
An important consideration indirectly related to Rule 1 factors involves the
benefits of lengthy delay of a suit which accrue to a party seeking expansive
discovery. Pertinent inquiries include the accrual of excess profits, the delay
of subsequent suits, the extinction of potential plaintiffs and the postponement of a large recovery.
The classic "fishing expedition" consideration needs careful evaluation,
especially if the complaint is vague. 140 The pertinent inquiry is whether the
party requesting information is seeking the advantage of the broad and liberal
discovery characteristic of antitrust for proof of an injury which clearly does
not involve an antitrust violation.
Tactical benefits should be evaluated as a counterweight to allowing discovery. The limited resources of a party may preclude compliance with excessive discovery or cause a party's attorneys to curtail their own discovery. A
related consideration is the operational impact on a party's business and key
personnel. The efficacy of this consideration has been fully supported by the
Supreme Court in a securities law context. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores14 1 the adverse impact of discovery on corporate operations was a
major justification for limiting standing in securities misrepresentation suits.
If a discovery request is of massive dimensions, then its potential for obscuring the issues and opening collateral inquiries should be considered. The
court should evaluate whether the requested information can be summarized
or condensed into useful form, since too much information can frustrate the
search for the truth just as inadequate information can lead to a wrong decision.142 Antitrust principles are concededly difficult to comprehend, but they
the subject matter of the suit was football and the business of conducting it. Kapp v. National
Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
139. This consideration should apply whether the information affects the party from
whom it is requested or is potentially damaging to one who is not a party but who has given
information to a party for another reason. See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation,
1977-2 Trade Cases 161,743 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (trade association information); United States v.
IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (third party information not given confidential
treatment when third party failed to comply with procedures of the case).
140. See Oak Distributing Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 370 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
The plaintiff-distributors brought an action after Miller acquired a Michigan brewer and
failed to assume the distributorship agreements. The court granted summary judgment for
Miller. The complaint had alleged violations of the Sherman Act §1, conspiracy, 15 U.S.C. §1
(1970), §2 monopoly, 15 U.S.C. §2 (1970) as well as the Clayton Act. The court was critical of
the plaintiff's complaint which alleged a violation of every section, including procedural sections. 370 F. Supp. at 901. The plaintiff had also alleged violations of the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. §205 (1970), and various unspecified Michigan laws. 370 F. Supp.
at 902. See also Fulton Co. v. Bearid-Poullan, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 604 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
141. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
142. The use of multiple guides for decision in a contested judicial proceeding can
ultimately lead to errors of logic or inference which causes erratic and non-rational decisions. See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
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fact a violation, a plaintiff should begin to develop a focus for his attack based
on the fruits of discovery in the initial phase of the litigation.
After all the applicable factors have been identified and subjectively
weighed by the court, the crucial balancing must occur. The degree of
relevance possibly enhanced by external policy considerations and given additional weight due to the private plaintiff's public policy enforcement impact
must be balanced against all the counterweights discussed above. The court's
discovery order can then be formulated in accordance with the result of this
balancing approach.
Rule 26(c)1 43 gives the court the prerogative to modify a discovery request.

Of course, the request can be denied or granted in toto, but many situations
call for intermediate action. One example is the allowance of partial discovery
with further discovery contingent upon the party seeking discovery producing
44
justification from the fruits of his preliminary search. A court's discretionary
capability to modify a request can be better applied when it has a complete
grasp of the factors bearing on its decision. The comprehension is a result of
applying both the primary and secondary analyses in decision making.
One innovation which should be considered is a direct transfer of the costs
145
of discovery if expense is the main objection. Rule 33(c)' allows a shifting of
burden by giving a party.the option, under certain conditions, to offer his opponent access to records rather than answering interrogatories. The court also
has the option und& Rule 45(b)(2)246 to make a party requesting information
from a non-party reimburse the non-party for complying with the subpoena.
to comply with a discovery
Costs and expenses incurred in compelling a 4party
7
37(a)(4).3
Rule
under
allowed
also
request are
Although as a general rule parties must bear their own litigation expenses,
a transfer of expense to a requesting party could be useful in mitigating enthusiasm for overly broad discovery. An expense provision in a discovery reHARV. L. Rav. 226, 292-93 (1960). Apparently nuisance requests can cause problems for both
the party requesting discovery and his opponent. The emerging trend is for computerized
data assimilation and indexing with teams'of para-professionals summarizing and organizing
discovered documents. See Halverson, Coping with the Fruits of Discovery in the Complex
Case - The Systems Approach to Litigation Support, 44 A.B.A. ANTrrRUsT L.J. 39 (1976). See
also Control Data Corp. v. IBM Corp., 1973-1 Trade Cases f174,363 (D. Minn. 1973) (govern-

ment sought intervention for contempt order against IBM for procuring destruction of computerized discovery index as part of settlement in private suit in violation of document
preservation order entered in government's suit); United States v. IBM Corp., 1973-1 Trade
Cases 174,392 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (IBM held to have -violated document preservation order by
negotiating destruction of plaintiff's computerized data base within twenty-four hours of
settlement of private action).
143. Fa. R. Cirv. P. 26(c). See note 76 supra.
"144. See, e.g., Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Tex-Elastic Corp., 320 F. Supp. 806
(D.S.C. 1970) (interrogatories and licensing agreements limited by court with leave to request
.
.. more expansive information after initial answers received).
145. Frn. R. Civ. P. 33(c).
146. FED. R. Crv. P. 45(b)(2). See United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., ,1974-2
Trade Cases 75,312 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). See Blank v. Talley Industries, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 627 (S:D.N.Y.
1972). Accord, United States v. IBM Corp., 62 F.R.D. 507, (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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